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Abstract
We introduce and study the class of generalized matching problems. Two
subclasses of this class are marriage problems (Gale and Shapley 1962) and
the housing market (Shapley and Scarf 1974). We search for strategy-proof
solutions to generalized matching problems. We show that if the core is a
singleton and is stable for all problems then it is strategy-proof as a solution.
We also show that on the class of problems with a non-empty core there exists
a Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof solution only if the
core is a singleton for all problems. Furthermore if such a solution exists, it
is the core.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78
Key Words: Matching Problems, Marriage Problems, Housing Market, Strategy-
Proofness, Implementation, Core, Stable Matchings.
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When one suggests alternative solutions to a public decision problem we usually find
some of them more reasonable than the others. But how do we compare different
solutions? What makes some of them more reasonable than the others? One consid-
eration may be the extent to which a solution suggests efficient outcomes. Another
may be the extent to which it is immune to manipulation. Or whether it is stable...
This list could easily be extended to take all aspects of a solution into account. But
one thing will be common in all items: They are all desirable properties we want to
impose on a solution.
In this paper we search for solutions to various classes of matching problems
1 . For
each of these classes we refer to solutions as matching rules. We search for solutions
which are efficient, and individually rational in the sense that no agent is ever worse
off than he would be on his own. In addition to these minimal requirements we also
would like agents not to be able to profitably misrepresent their preferences. This
property is known as strategy-proofness2.
An extensively analyzed solution in both cooperative game theory and economic
theory is the core (correspondence). An allocation is in the core of a problem if no
coalition can improve on it with its own "resources." In general, there is no reason
for such an allocation to exist for all problems and hence the core may not be well
defined. But whenever it is, it is also efficient and individually rational. What
about strategy-proofness? Is the core as a solution strategy-proof? This question
is not well defined since strategy-proofness is a property of single-valued solutions.
Nevertheless, in this paper we will identify a class of matching problems for which
there is a very clear relation between the core and strategy-proofness.
Two extensively analyzed classes of matching problems are the marriage problems
(Gale and Shapley 1962) and the housing market (Shapley and Scarf 1974). The
results concerning strategy-proofness in marriage problems are quite disappointing.
Roth (1982a) shows that there is no selection from the core of marriage problems
'For an exposition of game theoretic modelling and analysis of such problems, see Roth and
Sotomayor (1990).
2
Strategy-proofness was first analyzed in abstract social choice models where there are few
or no restrictions on preferences. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) show that, under
minor conditions strategy-proofness is equivalent to dictatorship. In models with more structure
(such as economic models) some positive results are available. See for example Barbera, Gul and
Stachetti (1993), Barbera and Jackson (1994), Ching (1993,94), Moulin (1980,94), Moulin and
Shenker (1992), Sonmez (1994a), Sprumont (1991) for some positive results and Sprumont (1994),
Thomson (1994) for surveys on recent results of strategy-proofness.
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which is strategy-proof. In fact, Alcalde and Barbera (1994) show that there is no
matching rule which is efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. On the
other hand the results pertaining to the housing market are much more encouraging.
Roth (1982b) shows that the core of the housing market, which is shown to be single-
valued by Roth and Postlewaite (1977), is strategy-proof. Moreover Ma (1994)
shows that it is the only matching rule which is efficient, individually rational, and
strategy-proof. What causes such different results in apparently similar classes of
problems?
In this paper we search for foundations of the differences in these results. We
do this by first showing how these two models can be obtained as special cases of a
general class of matching problems. Then we study strategy-proofness in this class.
The results we obtain explain the reasons for such different results in two models.
We show that for any model in this class, as long as the core is well defined there
exists an efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof matching rule only if the
core is single-valued. In fact, if such a rule exists it is the core itself. Furthermore,
as long as the core is single-valued it is strategy-proof under a minor condition.
We obtain the positive results of Roth (1982b), Ma (1994) for the housing market,
and the negative results of Roth (1982a), Alcalde and Barbera (1994) for marriage
problems, as direct applications of our general results.
An implication of our results is that the core is the key concept when one searches
for strategy-proof matching rules which are efficient and individually rational. If
there is any hope of having such a rule, it is the core. We believe this conclusion
provides important non-cooperative support for the core, a cooperative solution.
2 Model
A (generalized) matching problem is a triple G = (N, S, R). The first com-
ponent N is a finite set of agents. The second component S = (Ss)iEN is a list
of subsets of N with i E S; for all i E N. Here Si represents the set of possible
assignments for agent i. The last component R = (Ri)iEN is a list of preference
relations. Let P denote the strict relation associated with the preference relation
R; for all i E N. We consider the case where N, S are fixed and hence to define a
matching problem it suffices to specify a preference profile.
The preference relation R; of each agent i E N is a linear order on Si. Let R1Z
be the class of all such preference relations for agent i. Let R = HliEN Ti- For all
R E R, T C N, we denote the restriction of R to T by RT, and the set N \ T by
-T. For all i E N, we denote the set N \ {i} by -i.
A (generalized) matching p is a function from the set N into itself such that
1.ViEN p(i)ESi,
2. Vi E N |p '(i)| = 1.
Note that p is a bijection on N. For all i E N, we refer to p(i) as the assignment
of i at p. We denote the set of all matchings by M. Let pl E M be defined by
p1(i) = i for all i E N. We exogenously specify a subset M/ of the set of matchings
M as the set of feasible matchings. We always require that p E M
1 .
Given a preference relation R; of an agent i E N, initially defined over Si, we
extend it to the set of feasible matchings M
1 in the following natural way: agent i
prefers the matching p to the matching p' if and only if he prefers his assignment
under p to his assignment under p'. We slightly abuse the notation and also use R;
to denote this extension.
A matching p E M 1 is individually rational under R if p(i)Ri for all i E N.
We denote the set of all individually rational matchings under R by 1(R).
A matching p E M
1 is Pareto efficient under R if there is no other matching
p' E M 1 such that p'(i)R p(i) for all i E N and p'(j)Pp(j) for some j E N. We
denote the set of all Pareto efficient matchings under R by P(R).
A matching p' E M 1 dominates the matching p E M
1 via a coalition T C N
under R if
1. Vi E T p'(i) E T,
2. Vi E T s'(i)R p(i),
3. 3j E T p'(j)Pip(j).
In that case we say the coalition T blocks p under R. A matching p E M
1 is in
the core of the matching problem R E R if it is not dominated by any matching.
We denote the core of R by C(R).
A set of matchings N C M1 is stable under R E R if every matching in M 1 \ P
is dominated by some matching in N.3 Note that any stable set under R is a superset
of the core of R.
'In this paper we deal with the stability of singleton sets and hence the notion of stability
coincides with von-Neumann Morgenstern stability.
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A (generalized) matching rule is a correspondence W : R -+ M
1. A matching
rule p is Pareto efficient if p(R) C '(R) for all R E ?, and individually rational
if V(R) C 1(R) for all R E R. The next two properties concern single-valued rules.
A matching rule p is strategy-proof if for all R E R, for all i E N, and for all
R E Ri
V;(R)Ri;(R..., R;)
and it is coalitionally strategy-proof if for all R E R, for all T C N, and for all
RE E RT there exists i E T such that
dpi(R)Ridpi(R.-TR,.')
3 Results
Let C be the matching rule which selects the set of matchings in the core for each
preference profile.
4 We will refer to the matching rule C as the core. Recall that,
N, S, M 1 are fixed. The next proposition, which is a variant of a theorem in De-
mange (1987), concerns the coalitional strategy-proofness of C whenever it is single-
valued and stable.
Proposition 1: Let IC(R)| = 1 and C(R) be stable for all R E R. Then C is
coalitionally strategy-proof.
Proof: Let |C(R)I= 1 and C(R) be stable for all R E R. Suppose C is not coalition-
ally strategy-proof. Then, there exist R E 1Z, T C N, R1r E IT such that
Vi E T C(R-T, R')PC;(R)
Hence C(R-T, R') yC(R). Let p =C(R), s' = C(R.T, R').5
We have IC(R)|(= 1 and C(R) is stable for all R E R. Therefore y dominates p'
under R. That is, there exists a coalition U C N such that
Remark 1: Demange (1987) introduces a notion of coalitional nonmanipulability
for correspondences and shows that the core is coalitionally nonmanipulable as long
as it is non-empty and satisfies the following weaker notion of stability for all prob-
lems: A set of allocations is weakly stable if every allocation outside the set is blocked
by a coalition all of whose members prefer an allocation in the set to it. Proposition
1 is still valid if stability is replaced by weak stability. Demange's theorem reduces
to this stronger version of Proposition 1 whenever the core is single-valued.
Remark 2: A sufficient condition for the core being a singleton and stable for each
problem is that all matchings be feasible; that is M
1 = M. In that case Gale's
"top trading cycles" method can be used to obtain the unique matching in the core
which is stable. The proof of this is a straightforward modification of a proof in
Roth and Postlewaite (1977).
The core being single-valued is a very strong assumption. However the next
theorem states that as-long as the core is well defined there exists a Pareto efficient,
individually rational, and strategy-proof matching rule only if the core is single-
valued. Furthermore if such a matching rule exists, it is the core. Before stating
and proving this theorem, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: If there exists a matching rule p : 1 -+ M
1 which is Pareto efficient,
individually rational, and strategy-proof, then IC(R)I < 1 for all R E R and p(R) =
C(R) for all R E R with C(R) ? 0.
Proof: Let p : R -- M1 be Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-
proof. Let R E Z, p E C(R). Let R' E 1Z be such that for all i E N
1. jP'k <=- jPik for all j,k E Si\{i},
2. p(i)R;i and A j E Si \ {i) with p(i)RijRii.
Note that p E C(R').
Claim 1: p(R') = p.
Proof of Claim 1: Let v E M
1 
be such that v E 1(R'). Let i, E N. Let |NI= n.
Let ik+i = v(ik) for all k E {1, 2, ... , n}.
Suppose
i2P',p(i1) (1)
We will show that







Therefore T n U = 0. But then y dominates s' under (R-T, R') contradicting
p' = C(R-T, R-). Q.E.D.




Whenever Sp is a single-valued matching rule we write sp(R) = p instead of ,p(R) = {p).
6
5
by induction on k. Let us first show a~i2) V {i 1, i2}. We have i2 V {i1, (i1)} by
relation (1) and the construction of M,. Therefore i.(i 2) # i2 (i2 # i 1, v(i 1) =i2
and Iv-'(i2)1 = 1).
We either have v(i2) = it or v(i2)$ i1. If the former holds v E 1(R') implies
i1F~i2 and hence
That is
Vi E NI V E 1(R') p(i)Rv(i)
and therefore
which implies
?'(R')fnl?(R') = { )
iiR~2p(i2) (2)
by the construction of R;2. But then the coalition {i1, i 2} blocks p under R' by
relations (1) and (2) contradicting E C(R'). Therefore ii(i2 ) V {i 1,i2}.
Next suppose v~k {i 1, i2 . :ji} for all k E {2, 3, ... ,1} with 2 < 1 < n.
Then we have
l~ik) = ik+1 $ k for all k E {2, 3, ... , I)
Therefore
i.(ik) = ik+iI'Zik for all k E {2, 3,.. . ,l}
as v(R') E 1(R'), and hence
vi)= ik+1 Rt k/(ik) for all k E {2, 3, ... , l} (3)
by construction.
W e have it+1 = viti) {i, i2 . .. , it}. But v(ik) = ik+1 for all k E { 1,2,. ... ,1}
and v is a bijection therefore v(i,) V { Ps.. it+1 }. We either have v(i,+1) = i1 or
v(i 1+,) $ i,. If the former holds v E 1(R') implies i1 P,'+, it+1 and hence
completing the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2: cp(R) = a.
Proof of Claim 2: We will show that
c(R'T,RT)= for all TCN
by induction on the cardinality of T.
Let i E N. Consider the preference profile ( Ri R). By strategy-proofness and
Claim 1 we have
(,R', =R()R; p,(') =
therefore cpt(f?'.., R;) = p(i). But p is the only matching which is Pareto efficient
and individually rational under (R.L;, R;) such that Sp,(R'.;, R;) =p(i), therefore
p1;+1 it 1) (4)
by the construction of R;1+2. But then the coalition {i, i2 . . . , i:+1 blocks u under
Rf by relations (1), (3), and (4) contradicting E C(R'). Therefore v(i,+l) Qt
{il, , 2 ... , i1 ,}. Hence v(in) ¢ {i1, i2,.. in} by induction.
But we have
Next suppose
'e(R'LTRT) =f' for all T CNwith ITI =12< n (5)
We will show that (p(R'T, RT) =p for all T N with ITI = I+±1 <n.
Let T C N be such that ITI = I + 1. Let i E T. Consider the preference profileOLRUT). By strategy-proofness and relation (5) we havei2 = v(i1) ' {i1 }
13=L(22) g i1,22}
Rpi(RT\{q}, RN\T)U{i)) = p'(i)Ri4Pi(k-T, RT,
ira= v i I.) ii , . . i_ p} e(R'-T, RT)RiOi(RT\{i), R'N\T u{,)) = l
Therefore ij $ k for all j, k E N with j $ k which implies {ii, i 2,. .. , i,} = N.
Thus, v.(ia) g N contradicting v E M1 . Hence (11)R;, v(ii) = i 2.
therefore cp(RL T, AT) = (i). That is we have
Vi cET S',(R'T,RT) = (Z) (6)
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But p is the only matching which is Pareto efficient and individually rational under
(R' T, RT) such that relation (6) holds therefore
cp(R'T,RT) = p for all T c N with TI= 1+1 < n
Therefore co(R) = p by induction completing the proof of Claim 2.
Suppose we also have v E C(R) with v # p. Then by similar arguments we have
y = p(R) contradicting v # p. Therefore IC(R)I < 1 for all R E R. Furthermore
p(R) = C(R) whenever C(R) # 0 by Claim 2. Q.E.D.
Theorem 1: Suppose C(R) # 0 for all R E R and p7 :R -+ M be a matching rule
which is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. Then
1. IC(R)|= 1 for all R E 1Z,
2. p = C.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1.
Theorem 1 deals with domains where the core is well defined. The next propo-
sition deals with domains where the core is not necessarily well defined.
Proposition 2: Suppose IC(R)I > 1 for some R E R. Then there is no matching
rule which is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1.
4 Applications
4.1 Housing Market
Shapley and Scarf (1974) consider the following model: Each agent owns one indi-
visible good (say a house), and has preferences over the houses held by all agents in
the economy. An allocation is a permutation of the houses among the agents.
Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show that there is a unique core allocation. They
furthermore show that the core is stable. Roth (1982b) shows that the rule which
selects the core allocation for each problem is strategy-proof. Bird (1984) shows
that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. Ma (1994) recently shows that it is the only
rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof (and therefore
it is the only rule which is Pareto. efficient, individually rational, and coalitionally
strategy-proof).
In this section we obtain Roth's, Bird's, and Ma's results as a corollary to Propo-
sition 1 and Theorem 1.
We can obtain the housing market as generalized matching problems as follows:
Let Si = N for all i E N and M
1 
= M. That is, each agent ranks all agents
(interpreted as ranking the houses) and a matching is any permutation of the houses.
We have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Roth 1982b, Bird 1984, Ma 1990): The core in the context of the
housing market is coalitionally strategy-proof. Furthermore it is the only rule which
is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
Proof: Roth and Postlewaite (1977) shows that the core is a singleton for each
problem and it is stable. Therefore the core is coalitionally strategy-proof, and
hence strategy-proof due to Proposition 1. Uniqueness follows from Theorem 1.
4.2 Marriage Problems
Gale and Shapley (1962) introduce and study the following class of two-sided match-
ing problems known as marriage problems. There are two finite disjoint sets of agents
interpreted as a set of men and a set of women. Each man has a preference relation
over the set of women and staying single. Similarly each woman has a preference
relation over the set of men and staying single. An allocation is a matching of men
and women. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the core of a marriage problem is
always non-empty.
6 They also show that it may not be a singleton. Roth (1982a)
shows that there is no selection from the core which is strategy-proof. Alcalde and
Barbera (1994) improve on this result and show that there is no matching rule
which is Pareto-efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
7 In this section
we obtain Roth's and Alcalde and Barberk's results as a corollary to Theorem 1.
We can obtain marriage problems as generalized matching problems as follows:
We partition N into two non-empty disjoint sets M and W. That is, M U W =
6See also Roth (1985).
7 Kara and Sonmez (1993) weakens the incentive requirement and search for Nash implementable
matching rules. They show that any solution which is Pareto efficient, individually rational,
and Nash implementable is a supersolution of the core. Kara and Sonmez (1994) and Sonmez
(1994b) generalize this result to many-to-one matching problems and generalized matching prob-
lems respectively.
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N, M # 0,W $ 0,and MfnW = 0. Let Sm = W U {m} for allim E M and
S= M U {w) for all w E W. Let
M'={pEM|p(p(i))=i foralliEMUW}
Note that unlike the housing market, we do not allow for all permutations of men
and women. A man is assigned to a woman if and only if that woman is assigned
to him. We have the following corollary to Theorem 1:
Corollary 2 (Alcalde and Barbera 1994, Roth 1982a): There is no matching rule
in the context of marriage problems which is Pareto efficient, individually rational,
and strategy-proof (and hence there is no strategy-proof selection from the core).
Proof: Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the core is always non-empty, yet it is
not a singleton in general. Therefore Theorem 1 implies that there is no matching
rule which is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
4.3 Roommate Problems
Consider the following class of problems known as roommate problems. There is a
group of agents each of whom has strict preferences over all agents. An allocation is
a partition of the set of agents into groups of size one and two. Here we are assigning
either one or two persons to a room. We obtain roommate problems as generalized
matching problems as follows: Let S; = N for all i E N and
M'= {p EM | (p(i)) =i for all i EN}
Consider the following examples:





Note that in this problem staying single is each agent's last choice and each agent is
someone else's first choice. Therefore whoever stays single in a matching will form







We have C(R) = {p,v} where p(i) = jqp(j) = ip(k) = l,p(l) = k, and v(i) =
1, v(j) = k, v(k) = j, v(l) = i.
Corollary 3: There is no matching rule in the context of roommate problems which
is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
Proof: For Example 2 there are two allocations in the core and Proposition 2 implies
that there is no matching rule which is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and
strategy-proof.
5 Concluding Remarks and Related Literature
Strategy-proofness is a property motivated by the fact that agents will manipu-
late their preferences whenever they can gain by doing so. Its motivation is non-
cooperative. On the other hand the core is one of the basic solution concepts in
cooperative game theory. Our results show that in the context of matching prob-
lems it is possible to achieve strategy-proofness together with Pareto efficiency and
individual rationality only by means of the core. This result provides a link between
cooperative game theory and non-cooperative game theory and it gives important
non-cooperative support to the core, a cooperative solution.
Do these results extend to other interesting economic domains? Although saying
yes is premature at this point the literature seems quite consistent with possible
generalizations. Ledyard (1977) obtains a result in a very similar spirit for exchange
economies, and S5nmez (1994a) obtains analogous results for many-to-one matching
problems. In what follows we discuss these papers and other relevant literature and
the extent to which our results do or may extend to three interesting domains,
exchange economies, public good economies, and many-to-one matching problems.
Hurwicz (1972) shows in his seminal work that there is no solution that is Pareto
efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof in the context of two-person two-
good exchange economies. Motivated by this negative result Roberts and Postle-
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waite (1976), Barbera and Jackson (1995), and Ledyard (1977) follow three different
approaches. Roberts and Postlewaite (1976) show that for a wide class of problems
the gains from manipulating the Walrasian solution gets arbitrarily small as the
economy gets large enough. Barbera and Jackson (1995) totally drop Pareto effi-
ciency and characterize the class of individually rational and strategy-proof solutions
with some additional very mild requirements. They also show that no solution in
this class satisfy Pareto efficiency even in the case of large economies." Ledyard
(1977) shows that there exists a strategy-proof selection from the core only if the
core is single-valued. One important question is whether it is possible to extend Led-
yard's result in an analogous way to ours and show that there exists a solution that
is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof only if the core is single-
valued. If so Scarf (1962) and Debreu and Scarf (1963) core convergence results tie
these three approaches and link Hurwicz's negative result to them. Another impor-
tant question is whether there are interesting subclasses of large economies where
the core (which coincides in this context with the Walrasian solution) is actually
strategy-proof. What about coalitional strategy-proofness? This stronger property
is obviously much more plausible than strategy-proofness in the context of large
economies.
As far as public good economies are concerned, Ledyard and Roberts (1974) ob-
tain an analogous result to Hurwicz's impossibility result. Because of the difficulties
in obtaining core convergence result in this class, the only possible extension seems
to be linking the Ledyard and Roberts's result to the multi-valuedness of the core.
Finally, in the context of many-to-one matching problems S5nmez (1994a) ob-
tains analogous results and shows that there exists a solution that is Pareto efficient,
individually rational, and strategy-proof only if the core is single-valued and if such
a solution exists it is the core. He furthermore obtains the necessary and sufficient
conditions to obtain such a solution.
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